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Minsky’s (1975) seminal contribution was to underscore the importance of speculation in 
economic activity. Emphasizing that a firm’s investment decision is inherently a speculative 
one, he reintroduced asset prices back into Keynesian theory of investment. Any decision to 
acquire real capital assets, as he was keen to emphasize, bequeaths the firm with a certain 
liability structure that shapes its balance sheet for a long time to come. The market price of 
financial assets the firm issues to finance its expenditures reflects the future profit expectations 
at that time, but these expected returns might never realize as expected. Thus, any particular 
liability structure the firm puts in place on the basis of a set of future earnings expectations is 
either validated or contradicted by future events, with possibly dire consequences for its balance 
sheet. Since future earnings associated with real assets are uncertain, while the cash flow 
obligations of the firm stemming from its liabilities are not, all investment decisions inevitably 
involve a significant degree of speculation.  
Yet, despite his emphasis on the speculative character of investment decisions, Minsky 
paid little attention to asset price speculation per se, ignoring asset price bubbles and their 
macroeconomic effects. That is perhaps because his views were formed during the era of 
financial regulation, when speculation “could do no harm as bubbles on a steady stream of 
enterprise.” Clearly, times have since changed. Especially, in the 1990s, the world has seen the 
rise and burst of the high tech stock market bubble in the US, the persistence of liquidity trap in 
Japan and one currency crisis after another in emerging markets, all attesting to the growing 
importance of financial speculation in asset prices in economic life. Keynes’s old warning that 
the situation “…is serious when enterprise becomes the bubble on a whirlpool of speculation” 
has begun to ring true again. But, now, having paid little attention to the possibility of asset 
price bubbles for so long, economists seem to lack a clear idea as to how to conceptualize, let 
alone study, the macroeconomics of asset price bubbles. Especially damaging has been the 
pervasive influence of the efficient market hypothesis among economists since its rise in the 
1960s, which had the effect of bolstering Friedman’s (1953) contention that profitable 
speculation has to be by its very nature stabilizing. Most mainstream economists still subscribe 
to the view that asset price bubbles cannot possibly exist. 
By contrast, heterodox economists have all along recognized that financial markets 
could function like a “casino.” But, it is hard to say that they have successfully developed a 
theory of asset price speculation and its macroeconomic effects on the basis of Keynes’s 
perceptive insights in the General Theory on the stock exchange. Of course, the task was not   2
made any easier by Keynes himself who had shied away from weaving back his insights on the 
“beauty contest” nature of the asset price determination into his theory of investment and output 
in the GT, other than to suggest that the marginal efficiency of capital schedule could be subject 
to abrupt shifts. By contrast, in his earlier work, A Treatise on Money, asset price expectations 
and speculation, and what he then called financial circulation, played an integral part in his 
macroeconomic analysis of the trade cycle. Keynes on occasion remarked that his two works, 
the GT and the Treatise, complemented each other on monetary and financial matters, but 
among the following generations of his readers few had the benefit of any in depth knowledge 
of his earlier work.  
The objective of this paper is to revisit the Treatise for the fresh insights it can give in 
developing our understanding of financial macroeconomics that can also be of interest in 
enriching modern heterodox macroeconomic theory. This is made timely an exercise not only 
by the rising frequency of financial crises around the world, but also because the behavioral 
theory of finance, which has recently emerged in reaction to the efficient market hypothesis in 
the modern finance literature, seem to corroborate many of Keynes’s forgotten arguments in the 
Treatise along with his “beauty contest” analogy in the GT.  
The following discussion is organized in four sections. First section gives an overview of 
Keynes’s treatment of asset price speculation in the Treatise in the context of his business cycle 
analysis. The second section discusses the conditions under which speculation can be 
destabilizing. The third section develops a generic macroeconomic model with diagrams to 
highlight how output determination might work with self-sustained biases in asset price 
expectations in financial markets, which also captures the gist of the macroeconomic argument 
that is implicit in the Treatise. This is then contrasted with the argument in the GT. The last 
section includes a few concluding comments. 
 
I. ASSET PRICE SPECULATION IN THE TREATISE 
 
In the Treatise, monetary circulation has two components, industrial and financial, that are 
associated, respectively, with the circulation of goods and services and that of titles to financial 
wealth. The amount of money in industrial circulation is closely related to the level of output 
and expenditures. Financial circulation, by contrast, primarily reflects the size of what Keynes 
called the bear position, referring to those who choose to keep their resources in liquid form   3
having sold securities short. Keynes took the volume of cash deposits as a rough measure of the 
size of industrial circulation and savings deposits as that of the financial circulation.
1  
The desire to remain more, or less, liquid is of course not independent of the actual 
changes in security prices. The fall (rise) in security prices in relation to the short term rate of 
interest can partially offset the bearish (bullish) sentiment, thus the actual increase (decrease) in 
the volume of savings deposits also depends on the extent of the fall in securities prices. This 
implies that, “[t]here will be a level of security prices which on the average opinion just 
balances the bullishness [or bearishness], so that the volume of savings deposits is unchanged.” 
(CW, V, p. 224). If security prices fall (rise) beyond this point, then the savings deposits might 
actually decrease (increase). Keynes’s GT assumption that security price changes just balance 
the movements in bearish sentiment is here only a remote possibility. 
In the Treatise, Keynes defines four types of speculative markets in connection with 
different configurations of the bear position (CW, V, p. 226). These typically correspond to 
different phases of the business cycle. The first involves a decreasing bear position, i.e., a 
decreasing volume of saving deposits, at a time of rising security prices. Keynes calls this a 
“bull market with a consensus of opinion” and distinguishes it from a “bull market with a 
difference of opinion” where the bear position is increasing at a time when security prices are 
also rising. In the former case, which typically holds during early expansion, the preponderance 
of market opinion holds that security prices have not risen sufficiently, while in the latter case, 
corresponding normally to late expansion, an ever rising segment of the market thinks that 
security prices have risen more than sufficiently. The third case, which corresponds to early 
recession, is a “bear market with a consensus,” and again Keynes distinguishes this from a “bear 
market with a division of opinion.” The former involves a rising bear position, i.e., increasing 
volume of saving deposits, at a time of falling security prices and the latter a decreasing bear 
position when security prices are still falling. In the former, the predominant market opinion is 
that security prices have not fallen sufficiently and that they have fallen more than sufficiently 
in the latter.   
From the point of view of orthodox theory of finance, it does not make any sense to say 
that security prices have increased or decreased more, or less, than sufficiently if no new 
information has emerged at a given point in time. For, if securities are thought to be 
undervalued, then arbitrageurs would continue to buy them until their prices are bid up to a level 
that is no longer considered low. Likewise, if securities are thought to be overvalued, again,   4
arbitrage would bring their value down to a level consistent with what is considered to be their 
“true” value. Thus, at a given point in time, with a given information set, the prevailing asset 
prices must be the best estimates of fundamental values.
2  
However, Keynes’s approach in the Treatise is consistent with the modern “noise trader” 
(or the so-called behavioral) approach to finance, which holds that riskless arbitrage is not 
effective in relation to the prices of shares or bonds as a whole and severely limited even when 
it comes to the relative prices of individual assets (Shleifer and Summers 1990, Shleifer and 
Vishny 1997). According to this view, even when it is assumed that arbitrageurs know what 
fundamental values are, they face no riskless arbitrage opportunities when actual prices deviate 
from their true values. For with a finite time horizon, an arbitrageur faces two kinds of risk: 
when s/he, say, sells overvalued assets short it is possible that by the time s/he is supposed to 
liquidate his/her position (i). the economy can grow so rapidly that the true values increase, or, 
more importantly, (ii). the asset prices might be even more overpriced. In both cases, the 
arbitrageur would be experiencing heavy losses. Thus, the fear of loss would limit the initial 
positions the arbitrageurs take and thus prevent them from driving prices down in any 
significant way. Moreover, if we drop the assumption that arbitrageurs know what the true 
values are, the risk of loss they face is higher, and the compensatory shift in demand for the 
undervalued securities smaller. 
In a vein very similar to the modern behavioral approach, in the Treatise, Keynes remarks 
that when prices deviate from their “true” values no automatic mechanism exists in the short run 
to check their deviation. Opinion, or what we would today call, noise (Black 1986) moves 
prices. “If everyone agrees that securities are worth more, and if everyone is a “bull” in the 
sense of preferring securities at a rising price to increasing his savings deposits, there is no limit 
to the rise in price of securities and no effective check arises from a shortage of money” (CW, 
V, p. 229). However, as prices continue to rise, a “bear” position begins to develop, and that is 
what can eventually check the rise in prices. “…[I]n proportion as the prevailing opinion comes 
to seem unreasonable to more cautious people, the “other view” will tend to develop, with the 
result of an increase in the “bear” position…” (CW, V, p. 228-9). 
In Keynes’s discussion in the Treatise, the rise of the bear position at a time when security 
prices are rising plays an important role in explaining the turning point of a business cycle 
expansion. In his view, “it is astonishing … how large a change in the earnings bill can be 
looked after by the banking system without an apparent breach in its principles and traditions”   5
(CW, V, p. 272). Yet, the banking system’s ability to accommodate a rising level of production 
is typically impaired at some point during a business cycle expansion. That happens typically 
not because the banking sector is held back by the central bank or faces some intrinsic difficulty, 
but because the financial sentiment falters. The trigger can have a myriad of immediate causes 
but the underlying reason is almost invariably the fact that the actual performance of profits, 
though they might still be rising, falls short of the high expectations that underlie asset prices. 
As the view that the market might be overvalued begins to take hold, the bear position develops, 
and “…the tendency of the financial circulation to increase, on the top of the increase in the 
industrial circulation …break[s] the back of the banking system and cause it at long last to 
impose a rate of interest, which is not only fully equal to the natural rate but, very likely in the 
changed circumstances, well above it” (CW, V, p. 272).  
In a similar manner, a declining bear position during a business upswing prevents the 
interest rate from rising with increasing levels of activity. Again, stock decisions dominate flow 
decisions. It can, stylistically, be thought that in a given accounting period the amount by which 
the net increase in new securities issued by firms (investment) exceeds the net increase in 
demand for such securities by savers (savings) are purchased by those speculators who, 
expecting securities’ prices to rise, draw down saving deposits in the aggregate. In fact, if the 
bullish sentiment is strong enough the prices of securities can even rise, implying that the bond 
rate might actually decrease rather than increase. Thus, independently of the policy of the 
banking system, an increase in investment in excess of saving need not put any downward 
pressure on asset prices.  
 
II. “BEAUTY CONTEST” AND ASSET PRICE BUBBLES 
 
Ever since Friedman (1953) argued that destabilizing speculation would be unprofitable, and, 
thus, unsustainable in the long run, the mainstream view among economists has assumed that 
speculation as a rule could not be destabilizing. Asset price bubbles were considered highly 
unlikely if not impossible in a “normally” functioning market.  
The intuition behind Friedman’s argument rested on a simple view of arbitrage, in which 
the market comprises smart traders who know the true values and misinformed noise-traders. If 
securities are undervalued, as the argument goes, then the smart traders would continue to buy 
them until their prices are bid up to their true value. Likewise, if securities are overvalued, smart   6
traders would sell them, bringing their price down to their true value. Indeed, under these 
conditions, speculation is always stabilizing and profitable. Misinformed noise traders create 
riskless arbitrage opportunities that smart traders profit from, while making losses themselves. 
In other words, this implies that the rate of current price change is a function of the difference 
between the current price and the expected future price, which is by assumption equal to true 
value. In simple terms: 
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which clearly cannot be unstable, since the stability condition  0 > j  is always satisfied because 
the speed of adjustment is positive by definition. 
Undoubtedly, the assumption that smart traders or speculators know with certainty what 
the true value is, is exceedingly unrealistic. But, even under this strong assumption, it does not 
necessarily follow that the deviation of the current price of an asset from its true value creates a 
riskless arbitrage opportunity. As mentioned above, the speculator who sells overvalued assets 
short can find that by the time s/he is supposed to close his/her position, the true value has 
increased, or, that the assets in question have become even more overpriced.
3 In both situations,   7
the speculators who have sold securities short would be making losses. Even if the true value is 
known, it does not follow that it would be equal to the expected future price. Thus, because the 
fear of making losses would cause smart traders to limit the initial positions they take, in an over 
or undervalued asset, current price might not smoothly adjust to its true value. Needless to say, 
if we drop the assumption that speculators know what the true value is, the risk of loss they 
perceive is likely to be higher, and the compensatory shift in demand for undervalued assets 
smaller. That is why the modern behavioral approach to finance holds that the effect of 
arbitrage can be severely limited. 
This also takes us very close to a world described in Keynes’s (1936, Ch. 12) famous 
beauty contest analogy, where speculators base their expectations of future asset prices not only 
on what they think the true value is, but, more importantly, on what they think the average 
opinion about the average opinion is. In other words, noise (Black 1986) is at least as important 
as information about true values in causing asset price changes, rendering the resale price 
uncertain. Uncertainty about the future resale price means that traders lack a terminal value from 
which to backwardize, which in turn implies that they must not only form higher order 
expectations (i.e., on what others think others think) but also decide how much weight to assign 
them relative to what they themselves think the true value is (Hirota and Sunder 2003). Since no 
direct information exists on others’s higher order expectations, traders have to infer that from 
market trends, i.e., the magnitude and direction of changes in current price. 
For instance, if a trader observes that the price of an asset (or an asset group) which s/he 
thinks is already overvalued is still rising in price, s/he is led to surmise that either her/his 
opinion about the true value is wrong or that the price increase indicates a bubble, i.e., a self-
sustained rise in price on account of noise trading driven by the average opinion thinking that 
the average opinion thinks the price will keep on rising. In either case, the current price changes 
are likely to gain in importance in how the trader forms his/her expectation about the future 
price. The current change in price becomes either a proxy for the higher order expectations or a 
corrective on opinions about the true value, or, some combination of both.  
If so, the crucial variable that determines whether speculation is stabilizing or not very 
much depends on the relative weight traders assign to their higher order expectations (i.e., what 
they think others think others think) relative to their own assessment of what the true value is. 
To the extent that they do, they become more responsive to the current price change in forming 
their expectations about the future price. In Kaldor’s (1939) formulation, whether speculation is   8
stabilizing or not in this setting depends on the elasticity of future price expectations with 
respect to present price changes.
4  
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whereP is what the true value is believed to be (and is assumed constant for simplicity), and σ  
is the coefficient of elasticity of expectation of the future price with respect to the current 
change in price.  
 








− + = σ ,  
 

















which, in turn yields the following time path of price; 
 












< σ , shows that stability depends on both the elasticity of 
expectations and the reaction speed. If the reaction speed is assumed instantaneous ( ) 1 = j , a 
less than unitary elasticity of expectations ( ) 1 < σ  ensures stability, as Kaldor argued. In other 
words, destabilizing speculation—and an asset price bubble—requires that traders revise their   9
expected future price proportionally more than the change in current price. However, the lower 
is the reaction speed (j < 1), the greater is the extent to which the threshold value of σ  exceeds 
unity.  
It is highly plausible that both the reaction speed (j) and the elasticity of expectations 
(σ ) might respond to changes in market opinion as to the degree to which asset prices are 
overvalued. As remarked above, if a trader observes that the actual price is well above what s/he 
thinks the true value is and still rising, s/he either begins to lose confidence in his/her own 
opinion on what is reasonable or think that asset price increases have acquired the character of a 
bubble. In either case, an increasing number of traders who might think alike will either leave 
the market or become much more responsive to current price movements in forming 
expectations about the future price—either naively as noise traders or smartly as speculators are 
presumed to do. In this setting, unlike what Friedman foresaw, successful (read rational) 
speculators are those who engage in “trend” speculation, where they act like noise traders 
themselves in the short run, trying to feed the bubble rather than help deflate it (Delong et al 
1990).
5 Because the successful speculative strategy entails jumping on the bandwagon of noise 
traders and knowing when to get off while the rest rides on, this might also imply a rising 
reaction speed. Thus, any sustained trend of a current price increase from what the market 
opinion generally holds to be the true value, whatever the cause, is likely to raise both the 
elasticity of expectations and the reaction speed. While this does not explain how prices initially 
become misaligned, it suggests speculation can become destabilizing once price deviations 
exceed in size and duration a certain threshold. 
In a similar manner, Keynes’s discussion on how asset prices behave over the business 
cycle, in his Treatise, seems to presuppose that speculation can both be stabilizing and 
destabilizing, depending on the phase of the cycle. As discussed in the previous section, Keynes 
argues that agents form expectations about the trend value of asset prices and the weighted 
average of these opinions tend to shift over the course of a business cycle expansion, which are 
then reflected in the changing size of the bear position in the economy. He stylistically divides 
the expansion phase of a business cycle into two parts, where the preponderance of market 
opinion holds that asset prices are alternately undervalued and overvalued during the early and 
late periods of the cycle. The latter period owes its existence, and is prolonged in duration, to 
the extent that the banking system transfers the bear funds (bank deposits of those who have 
sold securities short) to those who still have a bullish sentiment that asset prices will continue to   10
rise. In other words, while asset prices are rising in both periods, in the former their increase is 
driven by fundamentals and in the latter by speculation. By implication, while speculation is 
stabilizing in the former period it becomes destabilizing during late expansion, giving rise to a 
bubble. 
Thus, Keynes’s argument in the Treatise, implies that the elasticity of expectations can 
vary endogenously over the business cycle. When traders observe that the actual price is well 
above what they think the true value is and still rising, they not only infer that higher order 
expectations are at work but also in increasing numbers assign greater weight to them (what 
they think others think others think) over their own opinion. They begin to either lose 
confidence in their own judgment of what is reasonable or think that asset price increases have 
acquired the character of a bubble. In either case, they become much more responsive to 
changes in current price in forming expectations about the future price. That, in other words, 
implies a regime shift from inelastic to elastic expectations as traders begin to discount their 
own opinions in forming expectations about the future price.  
Keynes’s discussion of the trade cycle in the Treatise presupposes of a regime shift of 
this sort, though he does not explicitly address the question of transition from one regime to the 
other. However, his argument seems to assume that during the upswing, actual profits cannot 
increase at an increasing rate, while asset prices often will. Thus, sooner or later, optimistic 
expectations, and thus the asset prices that they underlie, outstrip the actual performance of 
profits. The latter, though still rising, eventually falls short of the former, but the bullish 
sentiment tends to persist. 
The next section outlines a macroeconomic framework that highlights Keynes’s views on 
the macroeconomics of asset price speculation in the Treatise. The same setup is then used to 
contrast these views with the structure of the argument in the GT. The discussion adheres to the 
GT notion of the “short period,” defined in terms of a given set of “long period expectations,” 
but now assumes that these expectations can just as well refer to market opinion about trends, 
according to which changes in asset prices can be excessively or insufficiently high.  
 
III. OUTPUT DETERMINATION AND SPECULATION 
 
Unlike the GT where the prices of debts and equities are determined separately, all securities are 
lumped together as Keynes did in the Treatise. Consistent with this, two interest rates are   11
assumed: a short term rate that is the price of credit determined in industrial circulation and a 
longer term bond rate in financial circulation. Money supply as was the case in both Keynes’s  
works is defined co-extensively with bank money.  
In line with Keynes’s stylized simplification in the Treatise, it will be convenient to 
assume that bulls predominate over bears during the early expansion, while bears predominate 
over bulls during the late expansion. In the former period, the weighted average of opinion holds 
that asset prices will continue to increase, while in the latter period, it holds that they will fall.  
In Figure 1, the transaction demand for money is depicted in the first quadrant, where it 
is related positively to income and negatively to the interest rate,  ) , (
1 1 i Y L L = , with  0
1 > Y L  and 
0
1 < i L . This implies that the income velocity of money, given by the angleα , is a positive 
function of the interest rate. Going counterclockwise, the fourth quadrant indicates the regime of 
speculation that is exogenously given. A positive slope ( 0 >
dP
dY
), as depicted in Fig 1, implies 
that expected future asset prices are expected to increase ( 0 > dP ), when output is also rising 
( 0 > dY ). This corresponds to what Keynes called the “bull market with a consensus of 
opinion” which associated with “early expansion” in the Treatise. The “bull market with a 
division of opinion” in “late expansion” is in turn described by a negatively sloped line (Figure 
1.4), where future asset prices are expected to decrease ( 0 < dP ) while output is still rising 
() 0 > dY . In both periods, changes in the price of credit, i.e., the short interest rate, can change 
the intercept of this line to the extent that they affect expectations about the future short rates, 
and thus the bond rate.  
The third quadrant depicts the speculative demand for money as a negative function of 
the expected future asset prices,  ) (
2 2 P L L = , where  0
2 < P L .
6 For simplicity, the interest rate on 
saving deposits ( 1 3 M M − ) is ignored. Continuing to move counterclockwise, the second 
quadrant indicates the distribution of total money supply between active ( 1 M ) and inactive 
balances ( 1 3 M M − ) with a given base money and speculative money demand (
2 L ).  The 
magnitude of inactive balances measures the extent of the bear position referred to above. 
For ease of exposition, Figure 1 is drawn in such a way that the demand for active 
money is exactly equal to its supply. In Figures 1.1 and 1.2, by contrast, the demand for narrow 
money exceeds the available supply, to indicate the two different ways in which adjustment can 
take place. One mechanism (fig 1.1) involves rising income velocity of money, and possibly a   12
higher short term interest rate, which increases the slope of the transactions demand for money 






The other mechanism, depicted in (fig 1.2), involves an outward shift in the total money 
supply schedule in the second quadrant. The different views about what brings about this shift 
need not be important for the argument at this point. The outward shift signifies an endogenous 
increase that can result from either a change in the base money or the money multiplier, or some 
combination of the two. 
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Whatever is the exact combination of the two types of adjustment depicted in figures 1.1 and 
1.2, the banking sector finds it relatively easy to accommodate the higher transactions demand 
for money resulting from rising output without an interest rate hike. That is because the bear 
position keeps falling due to optimistic asset price expectations.  
But, the situation is exactly the opposite once the opinion that the market has become 
overvalued begins to take hold. In this case, the “regime of speculation” line in the fourth 
quadrant is negatively sloped, with the result that increasing output and transactions demand for 
money exerts much greater pressure on the banking system (fig. 1.4). Just as the demand for 
narrow money expands its available supply diminishes. A sharp increase in the short rate then 
becomes inevitable, bringing the expansion to an end.
8 
 
   16
   
  
 
We can also use the same set of diagrams to discuss the structure of the argument in the 
GT. In the GT, Keynes not only separated the determination of prices of assets from that of 
debts, but also assumed that the expectations about the former adjusted to the latter. Whether 
actual return on investment turns out to be less than or equal to what was expected, Keynes 
assumes that the expected rate of return on capital adjusts to the interest rate in equilibrium 
through variations in the scale of investment.
9 Speculative activity in the stock exchange does 
not influence the level at which the two rates equalize. “Long term expectations” refer to the 
future profit expectations that are reflected in equity prices with a given discount rate and are 
assumed given within his short period. This enables him to focus on asset price changes that 
would be brought about by changes in the interest rate resulting from shifts in the portfolio   17
choice between bonds and money alone. While this approach had the advantage of highlighting 
the potential of economic policy—to the extent interest rates could be controlled—in 
influencing asset prices, it at the same made it harder to conceptualize the macroeconomic 
effects of asset prices the market opinion held to be misaligned. 
The very structure of the marginal efficiency of capital, which as Keynes stresses is fixed 
by market valuation, implicitly precluded the notion of an asset price bubble. Note that if the 
marginal efficiency of capital shifts up on account of higher expectations of future profitability 
that are justified, then the initial increase in asset prices will cease to be excessive when actual 
investment and profits increase. Yet it is not clear how this case would be distinguished from a 
situation where the higher profit expectations are somehow unjustified or that the increase in 
asset prices are “excessive” in relation to these expectations, all other things again being equal. 
If investment rises with the higher marginal efficiency of capital as it should and the multiplier 
is what it is in both cases, then it is unclear how one could define market overvaluation, barring 
capacity or employment constraints.  
  In the context of our diagrams, all this means that, in contrast to Fig 1, the direction of 
the argument now runs clockwise (Fig. 2). With a given exogenous increase in the expected 
asset prices (at the same bond rate), shown in Quadrant 4, investment and then output is 
increased (where the intermediate steps are ignored). The higher output and income requires a 
higher quantity of transaction balances of money (Quadrant 1). With a fixed supply of money 
and the higher transaction balances, Quadrant 2 indicates the quantity of money that is left over 
for portfolio purposes. Quadrant 3 shows the amount by which the bond rate has to increase to 
balance the decrease in the amount of money left available for speculative demand. In turn, a 
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In the horizontal axis of Quadrant 4, note that we now have the current bond rate rather 
than the expected future price of securities as a whole. If “long term expectations” remain 
constant, it is assumed that the change in the bond rate raises the rate at which the expected 
future returns are discounted, lowering their present value and thus asset prices. As a result, the 
level of investment decreases, causing output to fall as well. Thus, unless the monetary policy of 
the central bank is accommodating, any expansion in output is self-limiting as it leads to a 
higher interest rate.  
Figure 1 and 2, do not depict fundamentally different conceptions of the macroeconomy, 
however, they emphasize different things. The former shows that if and when asset price 
expectations exhibit a strong trend component, their influence can be very significant, while the 
latter underscores how desired macroeconomic outcomes can be affected by controlling asset 
prices through changes in the interest rate. While the latter framework might be more applicable   19
to a world characterized by financial regulation and tranquility, the former appears to have 




The rising frequency of financial crises around the world, and the rise of the behavioral theory 
of finance have made revisiting Keynes’s emphasis on asset price speculation in his analysis of 
the trade cycle in Treatise a timely exercise once again. The objective of this paper has been to 
develop these ideas of Keynes that had been eclipsed by his much better-known analysis in the 
GT. Implicit in Keynes’s analysis in the Treatise is a theory of output determination that 
presupposes self-sustained biases in asset price expectations in financial markets. This provides 
a convenient setting for analyzing the macroeconomic effects of asset prices the preponderance 
of market opinion holds to be misaligned. The analytical structure of the GT, by contrast, does 
not lend itself as easily to analyzing the macroeconomic effects of asset price misalignments, as 
the very construction of the marginal efficiency of capital schedule arguably precludes asset 
price bubbles.    20
Notes: 
                                                 
1 Keynes maintained that saving deposits would typically be held in the form of “deposit accounts” 
(which corresponds to time deposits in the US) and while cash deposits would take the form of “current 
accounts” (checking or demand deposits in the US). 
 
2 The more elaborate justification of this position is based on “the efficient market hypothesis,” which  
has gained currency among economists after Samuelson’s (1965) “proof” that in a market that is efficient 
in appropriating all available information stock prices should exhibit a random walk and Fama’s (1965) 
demonstration that they almost actually do. But, neither proposition is considered valid any longer in the 
contemporary finance literature. Empirically, it is shown that stock prices do not exhibit random walk, 
and theoretically it is shown that unforeseeable prices are neither necessary nor sufficient for rationally 
determined stock prices. See, among others, Lo and MacKinlay (1999), Bossaerts (2002), and Shleifer 
(2000).   
 
3 Shleifer and Summers (1990) call these, respectively, the fundamental value and noise trader risk,  
 
4 See also Hicks (1946, pp. 205-6). 
 
5 In the modern finance literature on asset price bubbles the emphasis, until recently, was on rational 
traders’s risk aversion which was thought to prevent them from eliminating noise driven price 
movements. However, the focus has been shifting to “trend” speculation as the winning strategy for 
speculators, a fact well known to market participants all along (Soros 1987, and Temin and Voth 2004). 
 
6 Note that this differs from the usual interpretation where the speculative demand for money is made a 
function of the current interest rate. In the GT, the speculative money demand was a function of the 
difference between the current bond rate and what Keynes called the “safe” rate, which was a proxy for 
the expected changes in, and thus future value of, asset prices. Here, speculative demand is made directly 
a function of the expected future asset prices. If it is assumed that the safe rate is expected to remain 
unchanged, as it is usually done, every decrease (increase) in the current interest rate increases the 
expectation that bond prices will fall (rise) in the future, and thus raising (lowering) “the risk of 
illiquidity.” Under this assumption, the focus of the argument moves away from shifts in the liquidity 
preference function as a whole to variations in the demand for liquidity when the said function remains 
unchanged. Thus, the speculative demand for money, when expressed as a function solely of the interest 
rate, refers to the quantity of liquidity demanded, holding liquidity preference (i.e., the whole schedule) 
and expectations about the long rate constant. This is in contrast to Keynes’s original view of the effects 
of “bull and bear” sentiment on the demand for liquidity, which emphasized shifts in liquidity 
preference, i.e., shifts in the whole schedule and presumably a change in what is considered a safe rate as 
well. 
 
7 A higher short rate of interest can also affect the bond rate and thus cause the expected asset price line 
in quadrant four to shift right. For ease of exposition, we will ignore this effect. 
 
8 This can also set off a downward spiral, depending on which of the two effects it has on transactions 
and speculative balances is stronger. On the one hand, the higher short rate—to the extent it raises the 
bond rate by shifting in the expected in asset price line in quadrant 4—can lower the expected future 
asset prices and thereby exert a negative influence on expenditures and thus the demand for active 
balances. However, at the same time, the fall in the expected future asset prices causes speculative 
balances to rise as well. 
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9 Keynes writes, “Put shortly, orthodox theory maintains that the force which determine the common 
value of the marginal efficiency of various assets are independent of money, which has, so to speak no 
autonomous influence, and that prices move until the marginal efficiency of money, i.e., rate of interest, 
falls into line with the common value of the marginal efficiency of other assets as determined by other 
forces. My theory, on the other hand, maintains that this is a special case and that over a wide range of 
possible cases almost the opposite is true, namely, that the marginal efficiency of money is determined 
by forces partly appropriate to itself; and that prices move until the marginal efficiency of other assets 
fall into line with the rate of interest” (Keynes 1936, p. 178). 
 
10 To the extent that the velocity of transaction balances rises with the higher interest rate the short fall in 
idle balances available for speculative purposes and thus the resultant increase in the bond rate will be 
less.  
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